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Abstract. This paper employs the llopf bifurcation theorem to prove the existence of
complicated equilibrium trajectories under least squares learning in a standard version of
the overlapping generations model. The periodic and quasiperiodic learning equilibria exist
when the locally unique perfect foresight equilibrium is the monetary steady state, and
thus are induced by the introduction oflearning alone. Learning equilibria can be stable or
unstable depending on higher order derivatives of the underlying utility function not
specified by economic theory; examples of both attracting and repeffing invariant dosed
curves are provided. This research confirms the intuition of some previous authors, who
have suggested that stationary equilibrium trajectories under learning may differ from
those under rational expectations.
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comments on this and related work. Suggestions made by Michael Woodford materially
improved this paper. I also thank Albert Marcet, Mark Salmon, George Evans, Seppo
Honkapohja, and participants at the June 1991 Meetings of the Society for Economic
Dynamics and Control in Capri, Italy, and the May 1991 Midwest Mathematical
Economics meeting at Northwestern University, for helpful discussions. All errors are the
author’s responsibility.
Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views ofthe Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Rational expectations equilibrium is often viewed as a long run concept, where
agents have already learned the law ofmotion governing the system in which they operate.
A common research question, asked increasingly often in the recent literature, is how this
learning takes place, and more importantly, if it makes any difference for inferences from
dynamic general equilibrium models whether thelearning is explicitly modeled. Some have
argued that simple and plausible learning rules exist that do converge to rational
expectations equilibria under general conditions, and that therefore the rational
expectations concept is appropriate for naming the potential long run outcomes of a
dynamic model. Lucas (1987, p. 231) suggests, for instance, that learning “lend[s}
plausibility” to the theory of rational expectations, and Marcet and Sargent (1988, p. 171)
comment that:
It is remarkable that the “adaptive” least squares learning schemes are
attracted to rational expectations equilibria, and that, naive and
backward—looking as they are, they provide promisingleads on superior ways
for us economists to compute rational expectations equilibria. It is also
comforting that these adaptive mechanisms seem not to be attracted to
“bad” bubble equilibria as limit points.
In this view, the purpose of explicitly modeling learning is to select a single rational
expectations equilibrium as the likely outcome of a model under actual expectations, thus
helping to resolve the problem ofmultiplicity.’
On the other hand, some authors, such as Grandmont and Laroque (1990b, p. 2),
have suggested that there might be more to the problem, in the sense that “... learning
might generate endogenously complex nonlinear trajectories, along which forecasting errors
would never vanish.” In other words, instead of viewing the potential outcomes under
learning as either convergence to rational expectations or explosive nonconvergeuce, one
should recognize that these (generally speaking) nonlinear learning systems may possess
attractors other than the steady state. This paper provides an example of such an
‘See also the work on expectational stability by Evans (1985) and Evans and Honkapohja (1991).
1outcome. In a standard version of the overlapping generations model with learning as
represented by least squares autoregression, it is shown that the system need not be
attracted to a rationalexpectations equilibrium as a limit point. The alternative attractors
are dubbed learning eqi.tilibria.
The main result of the paper uses the llopf bifurcation theorem to prove the
existence ofperiodic and quasiperiodic trajectories that do not exist under perfect foresight.
These equilibria occur near the monetary steady state and depend entirely on fundamental
factors.2 In a learning equilibrium, the system follows a complicated dynamic path, yet
under the assumptions of the model, no perfect foresight periodic equilibria exist. ilence,
explicitly specifying the learning process underlying rational expectations can imply new
potential outcomes for the model that do not exist when it is assumed that “learning is
complete,” as is common practice.
The results of the paper can also be interpreted as demonstrating that learning
alone can lead to complicated dynamics in a simple overlapping generations model. Several
authors have shown that various propagation mechanisms can lead to endogenous
competitive business cycles in this model under perfect foresight; examples in this class
include Farmer (1987), Reichlin (1987), and Grandmont (1985). The analysis in this paper
shows that a learning assumption can provide another route to endogenous cycles in a
dynamic general equilibrium setting. The periodic equilibria are induced by learning alone
in the sense that they are produced in a setting where it is known that no cycles exist
under perfect foresight.
The bifurcation parameter is the gross rate of growth of the money stock, which is
the only policy parameter in the model. For any utility function meeting general
prescriptions, there is a rate of money growth “sufficiently high,” made precise in the
2That is, the equilibria under discussion are not induced by the introduction offrivolous variables
into the agents’ forecast functions, so these are not sunspot equilibria of the type discussed by Asariadis
(1981) and others.
2analysis, that causes a Hopf bifurcation to occur. The dynamic outcomes ofthe model may
then lie entirely on an invariant closed curve. Hence, this is a model where some monetary
policy rules are bad in the sense that they induce aggregatefluctuations, while other policy
rules are good in the sense that they allow convergence to the monetary steady state. A
Hopf bifurcation cannot occur under perfect foresight because in that case the dynamics of
the model are described by a first order difference equation which cannot give rise to
complex characteristic roots.
The next section outlines a version of the overlapping generations model underleast
squares learning. Section three discusses the Hopf bifurcation and presents the necessary
and sufficient conditions for such an event to occur near the monetary steady state.
Section four presents some results for simulated systems. Section five shows how forecast
errors can be eliminated in a periodic learning equilibrium, and the final section provides a
summary, draws conclusions, and suggests areas for further research.
2. An overlapping generations model
A standard version of the overlapping generations model is employed; for a detailed
account see Sargent (1987). The presentation here is in terms of the gross inflation
rate—the inverse of the gross rate of interest—in order to facilitate the introduction of
least squares learning.
An infinite horizon economy is populated by agents who live for two periods. The
agents are indexed n = 1 ... JV(t), where N(t) indicates the number of agents born at
time t. There is no storage and there are no bequests. Agent it born at time t is
endowed with w~(t)at time t and w~(t+1)at time t+1; taxed at r~(t),r~(t+1);and
consumes c~(t),c’(t+l). The agents maximize utility U~[c~(t), c’(t+l)} where (i)
indifference curves are convex; (ii) more is preferred to less; (iii) U’~~1/ U~2
—~ ~ as
c’(t)/c~(t-{-l) 0 and U~/ U~2
—+ 0 as c~(t)/c~(t+1) —+ ~ and (iv) c’(t), c~(t+1)are
normal goods. The government consumes G(t) 0 units of the consumption good, levies
3lump—sum taxes r’(t), r~1(t), andlends (borrows) L~(t)> 0 (< 0) by negotiating one
period loans at time t. The loans are repaid the next period in the amount of R(t)L~(t).
The solution to the agent’s problem requires that U~2/ L1~= 1/R(t). The individual
agent’s supply of savings t = f~[w~(t) — r~(t),w’(t-1-1) — r~(t+1),R(t)] is increasing in
the first period after tax endowment, decreasing in the second period after tax endowment,
and, generally speaking, ambiguous in the gross rateofinterest R(t).
In particular, the standard assumptions on utility given by (i)—(iv) are in general
insufficient to require savings to depend positively on the interest rate in the overlapping
generations model. An auxiliary assumption that savings does depend positively on the
interest rate amounts to an assumption that c~(t) and c’(t+l) are gross substitutes.3
The work ofSonnenschein (1973) and others has shown that any continuous function could
be an excess demand function; full generality in this regard would allow complicated
dynamics under rational expectations, and possibly even chaos, as has been shown by
Grandmont (1985). Therefore, the simple overlapping generations model has, as a logical
possibility, complicated and chaotic equilibrium paths based on perfect competition,
perfect foresight and utility maximization.
However, in this paper, cyclic and chaotic perfect foresight equilibrium paths are
ruled out by the following:
Al. Savings depends positively on the rate ofinterest.
Because this assumption is made and maintained throughout the paper, the complicated
equilibrium paths derived will be induced by the introduction oflearning alone.
The model can be completed by introducing a role for currency. Denote the
nonnegative price level by P(t), and suppose that at time t = 1 the government owns
3See, for instance, the discussion in Sargent (1987) and the references cited therein.
411(1) > 0 units ofcurrency. The government budget constraint is
G(t) = R(t_1)L~(t_1) — L9(t) + [H(t) — H(t—l)}/P(t) + ~r~1(t) +
Arbitrage requires that the rate of return to loans equals the rate of return to holding
currency, R(t) P(t)/P(t-i-l). The government budget constraint can therefore be
rewritten
G(t) = R(t—l)[Lfl(t_l) — Ll(t—1)/P(t—1)] — [i/(t) — H(t)/P(t)] + ~r’1(t) + ~r~(t)
where H(0) = 0 and L9(0) = 0. Loan market equilibrium requires
~ [~( t), w~( t) — r~( t), w~( t+1) — T~( t+1)] = H(t)/P(t) — L~( t).
While this more general framework could be retained in what follows, some
simplifying assumptions will be applied in order to keep the thrust of the paper clear, and
also to maintain comparability to other work—particularly Marcet and Sargent (l989b).
First, suppose population is fixed and normalized to unity, and secondly set L~(t)= 0 V t.
Use the arbitrage condition R(t—1) = P(t—1)/P(t) to obtain
(1) = f[P~/F~P~÷1].
where ff~] is the aggregate savings function, and where parenthetical notation is replaced
with subscript notation for convenience. The following assumption is employed:
A2. Aggregate savings is positive.
The process for currency creation is given by
(2) JJ~ = OH~1
where 9> 1 is thegross rate of currency growth, a policy rule chosen by the authorities.4
4The model given by (1) and (2) corresponds to Sargent’s (1987) example 7.6, p. 271, or equally
well to Grandmont (1985) with the addition of the maintained gross substitutes assumption Al. Marcet
and Sargent (198gb) use a slightly different version of the government budget constraint, lI~ = OHt~i+
EPt, where ~ i8 the fixed real government deficit; identical results can be obtained with this
formulation (as will be shown in section four, example 2) viewing ~ as the bifurcation parameter. The
system described by equations (1) and (2) can also be viewed as a version of the Cagan model of
hyperinflation.
5This paper is concerned with the analysis of the system defined by (1) and (2) under least
squares learning.




Given a specification for agents’ utility functions, the savings function can be derived and
the system can then be reduced to a nonlinear difference equation in
Learning can be introduced into the model by assuming that the forecast price is a
function of past prices
= p(P~,..., Ps).
The least squares autoregression used to describe learning in this paper is given by
(4a) =
—1 i—i
(4b) = [~P2~] ~
That is, agents form expectations by computing a first order autoregression using data
available through time t—1. Versions on this theme have recently been studied extensively
by Marcet and Sargent (1989abc) and Sargent (1991). In order to make the system under
learning tractable, the formula in (4ab) can be written recursively as:8
(5a) = st—i + ~ k—1
—
(Sb) = [~:~~—1]
Combining (5ab) with (1) and (2) implies
5See section four for some examples of solutions under perfect foresight.
8See Harvey (1981) or Ljung and Soderstrom (1983) for details of deriving recursive least squares
formulas.
6(6) = ~ +g~ -
where
= “~—2~ ‘~_i]—~.
The remainder of the paper is primarily concerned with the analysis of this system.
Equation (6) has a fixed point at 13 = 0 this is the monetary steady state of the model.
Assumption 2 guarantees that money demand is positive at this stationary equilibrium.
There is also an autarkic steady state in the model; this will be denoted by 13 = 13> 0.
3. Learning equilibria
The heart of the analysis concerns a Hopf bifurcation near the monetary steady
state. Let the characteristics of the economy, including the gross rate of money growth,
the endowments, and the parameters of the utility function, be indexed by a single
parameter ~ in some open interval of ~ the critical value at which the Hopf bifurcation
occurs. Denote the interval by (~‘~b)’ where ~ <~&~ <~
The dynamics ofthe economy are described by
f (134)
(7a) fi~ = fi~_. + g~1of (134) —
(7b) fit—i =
1 f(fi;12)2 —i
(7c) g~ g21 1 + 1
which is a rewrite ofequation (6). Denote (7abc) by ‘y~= G,~(’y~_1), where = [fit’ fi~_1’
C: u .~ is defined by the right hand side of (7), and U is a subset of O~such
that 13 E (0,~)and g E (0,1). A locally unique fixed point is given by ~ = [0 0 ~
where ~ is the limiting value of g~ as time tends to infinity. A lemma establishes the
7value of this limit when fi~converges to the steady state at 13 = 0. The lemma also
establishes that g~remains in a neighborhood of ~ when fi~remains in a neighborhood
of 0
LEMMA 1. (i) If lim~~fi~ = 0, ~ lim2~,,g~ = 1 ~—2 (ii) Let c, e’ be positive real
numbers, and let p be the bifurcation parameter, where p0 denotes the bifwrcation point.
If, at some time r> 0, {‘~~}‘~ c (0— ,O+e), then {~~}‘~ c (~—E’,~+f’). Furthermore,
I — 1Lot —40 ,‘ C —40 ,‘ E’—40.
PROOF. See Appendix 1.
Focus will be placed on bifurcations near the monetary steady state 13 = 0. A fact
about the llopfbifurcation is that the radius ofthe invariant closed curve is proportional to
I ~ — ~, so that the cyclic outcomes can be induced to occur arbitrarily close to the
steady state at 13 = 0 by choosing p arbitrarily dose to p0 (Ruelle, 1989). Thus, part
(ii) of lemma 1 applies to the case where the sequence {fi~}’~ is a limit cycle about 0
when p E (p,p5). Lemma 1 can be applied to approximate the system (7abc) by a
linearization at the steady state, replacing g~with its limiting value ~. The Jacobian is
given by
(8) DG(’y~,p) = 1 — ~ + J -J 0
°~~—1/°~~_1 °~~_1/°~~2 ~[i +~]_2
where J = —~0ffl(U’)/AU1). The notation is meant to emphasize that the derivative
ffl(Ul) is taken with respect to fi~,not fit, so that its sign is negative by assumption
1. Hence J> 0 by assumption.
The Hopf bifurcation theorem is stated in appendix 2. It applies to mappings
8~indexed by a single parameter from an open subset U of ~ into ~ The bifurcation
occurs when the Jacobian of the map, evaluated at the fixed point, has complex roots
which pass through the unit circle at p = p0. Heuristically, then, the first steps in
applying the theorem are to find the conditions for complex roots and to reduce the
problem to a problem in 1R2.
Lemma 1 implies that when ~ = 0 one ofthe roots of (8) is given by 1/02,
which is always between zero and one. The second part of the lemma implies that this is
also approximately true near the bifurcation point. This fact can be used to achieve a
reduction in the dimension of the problem via an application of the center manifold
theorem stated in appendix 3. Essentially, the theorem states that near a fixed point,
recurrent behavior such as stationary states, cycles, and invariant closed curves must occur
(locally) in a center manifold.7 In the present case, since the Jacobian DG(~y*,p) is
available analytically (and since the third root of [8] is stable), the theorem implies that
analysis can proceed as ifthe entire Jacobian consisted ofthe submatrix given by
(9)
1 0
where F is defined by the right hand side of (7ab). This amounts to finding the zeros of
the characteristic equation of(9), which, denoting the roots by p, is given by
(10) p2—[02+J]p+J=o.
In order to apply the Hopfbifurcation theorem, define = [13 131’ #* = [9 0]’
and denote = F(~~1),~* = F(~). The theorem will be applied in three steps.
First, conditions are derived under which the eigenvalues of DF evaluated at the fixed
point can be complex. Next, it will be shown that there is a critical value p0 for which
these roots change stability (that is, a value p0 such that the roots have modulus one).
Finally, conditions (ii) and (iii) ofthetheorem will be analyzed.
7See Grandmont (1988) for a discussion.
IL
9LEMMA 2. (Complex roots).
Let p, ~ be the roots of DF(çó*). Then a necessary condition for p, ~ to be complex
conjugates is that 0 < J < 4. A sufficient condition is that J = 1.




which implies p, ~ complexif
(l—~+ J)2<4J.
For this condition to hold, J> 0 is required. Because 0 < ~ < 1, J < ~i s also required,
which establishes the necessary condition. Within this range, J = 1 is the only value of J
for which the condition holds regardless of the value of ~, which establishes sufficiency. I
Lemma 2 implies that a Hopf bifurcation can occur about the steady state under
least squares learning only when ffi(U1) <0 (implying J> 0); hence only when cycles
and chaos are ruled out under perfect foresight. That is, theexistence ofa Hopfbifurcation
in this model requires the imposition of a gross substitutes assumption, which is known to
be sufficient to eliminate cycles and chaos under perfect foresight.8
Next, the meaning of the critical value of the bifurcation parameter p is
investigated. The roots p, ~ are, at the point of the Hopf bifurcation, given by the
complex conjugates p, ~ = u ~ vi, where
u=(1—~+ J)/2
~4J — (1 —~+
2
A bifurcation occurs if some value p0 exists such that when p = p0 these roots pass
8See Sargent (1987) for a. discussion of this fact.
10through the unit circle. A simple calculation shows that modulus is one when J = 1,
which is when
—~Of~(U’)/AU1) = 1.
This equality can hold so long as ffl(U1~)< 0, which is again the gross substitutes
condition in assumption 1. Substituting the limiting value of ~ shows that J = 1 when
f(U’)/f(04) = 0/(l —02).
The nature of the savings function J~.)is determined in part by the parameters of
the utility function underlying the model; these parameters can be taken to be fixed for the
present analysis. Therefore the general bifurcation parameter p can be thought of as the
gross money growth rate 0 in the present context. The following theorem shows that there
is, under general conditions, some value 00 E (1,w) that makes J = 1. At this same value
00 the roots of equation (10) are complex and condition (iii) of the Hopf bifurcation
theorem holds. Taken together, these facts imply the existence of a Hopf bifurcation in
this system near the steady state with 0 = 00.
THEOREM 1. (Existence of a Hopf Bifurcation).
Let 13 = ~ be the autarkic equilibrium of the model. Under maintained assumptions, the
monetary steady state occurs at 13 = 0 < ~. Assume (i) the limits lim9~ f~(73) and
lim~1f~(l)are finite, and(ii)
(1+ 9_2) f 0)2
fifi 00 (f’ — 0~) f(00)
where is the second derivative ofthe savings function with respect to 13. Then a value
E (1,~) exists such that the following conditions hold simultaneously
(a) p, ~ are complex conjugates,
(b) p has modulus one, and
(c) dR > 0, R ~ u2 + v2.
p=po
11PROOF. By Lemma 2 the sufficient condition for complex roots is that J = 1, or
f(U1)/XU’) = 0/(i —02).
Denote f*(9) = f~(U1)/flU’),and 2(0) = 0/(1 — 02). By the definition of modulus R,
J = 1 is also the condition for the roots to cross the unit circle. Hence, (b) ~ (a).
The function z(0) is continuous and monotonically increasing in 0 V 0 E (1,w).
Furthermore, lim~1.z(0) = -~nand lim~z( 0) = 0.
Underthe assumptions on utility and assumptions 1 and 2, ffl(U1) < 0 and .kU1)
> 0, so that f*(.) <0. Since j~9) = 0, lim~—~ f~(~)= -in. In addition, since fl•) is
monotonically downward sloping, the point where jr.) = 0 is unique; hence f*(1) is finite.
Therefore there exists a 00 e (1,cn) such that J = 1. This proves parts (a) and (b) ofthe
theorem, and is illustrated in Figure 1.
Part (c) can be verified by direct calculation, notingthat
dR =dJ .1
p—p0 0=0~
Neither of the assumptions (i) or (ii) are very restrictive, at least for the types of
examples considered later in the paper. In particular, .j~< 0 at the bifurcation point 0
= 00 is sufficient for (ii).
Strong resonance cases
To understand condition (iii) ofthe Hopfbifurcation theorem, translate the roots p,
~ into polar coordinates as






12so that a is a function of 0, denoted a = a(0). Condition (iii) requires a(00) # 2~r/q
for q = 1, 2, 3, 4. At 0 = 00, J = 1 and the equations become
cos a = (1 + 0-2)/2
sina=
2
Then if, say, 00 = 1 (which is not allowed anyway), cos a = 1 and sin a = 0 so that a
= 2ur, which is a value of a cited in condition (iii). These situations are known as
“strong resonance” cases, and are ruled out by assumption. That is, values of 00 E (1,n~)
are allowed, excepting those that make condition (iii) of the llopf bifurcation theorem true.
Strong resonance cases can be analyzed using alternative methods (see boss, 1979), but are
ignoredhere since they are exceptional in anyevent (Grandmont, 1988).
So far, this section has demonstrated that a Hopf bifurcation occurs in the model
under general conditions at a critical value of the gross rate of monetary growth. Two
topics remain concerning the nature of the dynamics generated as 0 passes through 00.
First, the dosed invariant curve, the existence of which has now been established, may be
either asymptotically stable or unstable; in the terminology of the mathematics literature,
the Hopf bifurcation may be either supercritical or subcritical. Second, the nature of the
periodicities on an invariant closed curve warrant discussion.
Stability oftheinvariant closed curve
From the last portion ofthe statement of the Hopf bifurcation theorem in appendix
2, the stability of the invariant closed curve is seen to depend on the value of a certain
coefficient v.,2 at 0 = 00. The value of this coefficient can be calculated for the present
model, although the calculations are quite arduous. Unfortunately, the evaluation of
w2(0~)involves second and third derivatives of excess demand fi.) and hence third and
fourth derivatives of the utility function U. Since the signs of these derivatives are not
13given by theory, the conclusion must be that the invariant closed curve may be either
attracting or repelling. Examples ofboth possibilities are provided in the next section.9
Periodic and cluasi—Deriodictrajectories
When the utility function is such that an invariant closed curveis stable, it remains
to understand the nature of the dynamics generated by the map GIL(S). There are two
possibilities. One is that all points on the circle are periodic, with the period length
denoted by k. Another is that none of the points on the circle are periodic. This latter
case is not chaotic, however; the trajectories are said to be quasiperiodic, in that they
nearly repeat every k periods. The motion can be visualized as a rotation of a certain
angle ~ on the unit circle. If a/2ir is rational, the periodic case is obtained, while if
Zk/27r is irrational, the quasiperiodic case holds.’°
Although the angle E~can be calculated for the present model, it is not usefulto do
so. Any small change in the parameters of the model can change a/2ur from rational to
irrational and hence change the dynamics. The most that can be said, therefore, is that
when a closed invariant curveexists andis asymptotically stable, the nonlinear map G(.)
can have either oftwo types ofdynamics, periodic or quasiperiodic.
This section has shown that a Hopf bifurcation occurs in a simple overlapping
generations model under least squares learning. It is assumed that the money supply is
growing and that no equilibrium cycles exist under perfect foresight. The bifurcation
occurs at a value of the gross rate of money growth that is “sufficiently high.” Such a
value of the bifurcation parameter exists under general conditions. The analysis is local
andconcerns a neighborhood of this critical point, 00 E ~0a’0b~ For values of 0 such that
0 < 0 < 00, themonetary steady state is locally stable underleast squares learning. As 0
increases through 0 = 00, either an unstable invariant dosed curve vanishes (subcritical
9See also Farmer (1987) and Reichlin (1987).
10Grandmont (1988) provides details.
14Hopf bifurcation) or a stable invariant closed curve emerges (supercritical Hopf
bifurcation). In either case, the steady state becomes unstable. In the subcritical case, the
system simply diverges. However, in the supercritical case the equilibrium trajectories now
become periodic or quasiperiodic. Whether the bifurcation is supercritical or subcritical
depends on characteristics of the underlying utility function which are theoretically
unspecified. Hence, the main result is that in this model there is always some critical value
of the gross rate ofgrowth of the money stock such that beyond this rate, the model under
least squares learning can attain an equilibrium that does not exist under perfect foresight.
4. Parameterization and simulation
The results of the previous section can be made more concrete by parameterizing
the model and simulating the implied system. Several versions of the model studied by
Marcet and Sargent (1989b) are employed.
ExamDle 1
In this example, the aggregate savings function islinearized as
(11) H~/P~= 1_AF~P~+i/P~
for A E (0,1), while currency growth is given by equation (2), reproduced for convenience
as
(12) JJ~ =
where 0 E (1,A~).11 The savings function in equation (11) can be derived from the case
where agents have logarithmic utility U = in c1 + in c2 with the first period endowment
set to 2 and the second period endowment set to 2A. The parameter A therefore
represents the size of the second period endowment relative to the first period endowment.
The linear specification is also more than sufficient to rule out cycles and chaos under
t1This amounts to Marcet and Sargent’s (1989b) model with their 7 = 1 and ~ = 0.
15perfect foresight (that is, to impose assumption 1).
lithe model is closed using perfect foresight, the stationary equilibria of the system
are solutions to
(13) = A~+ 0—
There are two stationary equilibria, fi~ = 0 and fi = A~,and 0 < A~.The stationary
equilibrium at 0 is the monetary steady state, while the equilibrium at A~ is the
autarkic outcome where zero real balances are demanded. The qualitative graph of (13) is
given in figure 2. Equilibrium sequences ~ are indexed by fin. All equilibrium
sequences save one = fl~) converge to the autarkic equilibrium.
Under least squares learningthe system is described by
(1 — Afi~2~
(14) fi~ = fi~_~ + g~_1 [o (1 — Afi~1) —
where
9t—1 = ‘~—2[~ ~1] 1
The asymptotic behavior of the system can be analyzed by simulating (14) with initial
conditions for and near the monetary steady state 13 = 0.12 According to
Theorem 1, a value of 0 exists such that a Hopfbifurcation occurs.
For this simulation, A = .9 and 0 ~ 1.0374, which is near the bifurcation point.
The autarkic equilibrium occurs at = 1.111. Two cases are illustrated, one where 0
is less than thebifurcation point 00, and onewhere 0.4 00 from the left.
In Figure 3, 0 = 1.037. Both the perfect foresight and the least squares learning
systems are provided with the same initial condition at = 1.047. The perfect foresight
system converges to the high inflation stationary state, while the system under learning
converges to the steady state at 13 = 0. This illustrates a theme in the recent literature on
learning, that the stability properties of stationary equilibria can be reversed under
121n all of the simulations that follow, fi..~ = fib. The recursive formulae (7abc) were employed.
16learning relative to perfect foresight.13 When the value of 0 is closer to 1 or the initial
condition is closer to the monetary steady state, or both, the system under learning
converges more rapidlyto the monetary steady state at fi~ = 0.
Figure 4 illustrates the case where the money growth rate is increased to 0 =
1.0374885 and the initial condition is fl~ = 1.0474885. The perfect foresight dynamics are
qualitatively unchanged, but the system under learning has undergone a bifurcation and
now orbits about the steady state at fi~ = 0. Figure 5 plots the invariant closed curve in
~ space for 0 = 1.0374885. In this diagram the steady state is the point in the
ellipse at (1.0374885,1.0374885). Although it is not apparent from the diagram, this
closed curve is repelling.
Example 2
This example is exactly the same as example 1 except that equation (12) is replaced
with the Marcet and Sargent (1989b) specification
(12’) H~=0H~1+
The purpose is to show that the same bifurcation can be obtained by setting 0 = 1 and
examining the case of positive fiscal deficits ~, now taking ~t o be the bifurcation
parameter. With the given parameter values, the existence of a stationary equilibrium
requires that e < Las = .002633403. The bifurcation occurs near ~ ~ .0024. The
periodic equilibrium is given by the graph in Figure 6. As in example 1, this dosed curve
is repelling.
Examnle 3
This example produces an attracting closed curve. The logarithmic utility function
of examples 1 and 2 is replaced with a CES utility function U = (c~+
135ee especially Grandmont and Laroque (1990) and Marcet and Sargent (i989b).
17Endowments are set as in example 1. The system is given by
2 + 2Afl
(iSa) H~/P~=2— +
(15b) H~ = 0H~1
Money demand is zero when fi = A”4. The parameter p is set to .8 for this example.
lithe system is closed using perfect foresight, and ifthe second period endowment is set to
zero (A = 0), the system has a closed form representation as the difference equation
(16) fi~ = [0-~’fi~_i(~ +fi~~) — 111/4.
This equation has a fixed point at 13 = 0. Because A = 0, the autarkic equilibrium is
represented by a sequence ~ with lim2~fi~ = ~. The system under learning can be
simulated by substituting (iSa) into equation (6).
In this example, the bifurcation point occurs at 00 ~ 1.24. When 0 < 00, the
steady state at fi = 0 is the attractor under least squares learning. When 0 > 00, the
attractor for the system is a dosed curve. Figure 7 illustrates the learning dynamics after
thebifurcation point. In the diagram, 0 = 1.243 is the monetary steady state. The initial
condition is very close to the steady state, ~ = 1.246. At this value of 0, the steady
state is unstable and the system is attracted to the closed curve. The periodicity in this
case is 11, and can be computed directly from thediagram.
Examole 4
This example makes use ofa projection facility. Some authors have suggested that
the use of such facilities can improve the convergence properties of least squares learning
mechanisms by keeping the system in a region that has an economicinterpretation. In the
model analyzed here, the only interesting cases are ones where the sequences for currency
and prices are strictly positive. To guarantee this outcome, one might assume that agents
never forecast negative prices. This can be accomplished as follows. Let the system under
learning in example 1 be givenby equation (14) when fi~ E (0,A~),and otherwise be given
18by fi4
= fi~1.The projection facility has the effect of containing the system when it
threatens to enter a region that does not make economic sense.’4
When the model of example 1 is augmented with a projection facility, very erratic
dynamics are possible under learning. In Figure 8, the gross rate ofmoney growth is set to
1.1, which is past the bifurcation point. The time series presented consists of the
observations from 50,000 to 50,500. The system shows no tendency to converge either to
the monetary steady state at fi = 1.1 or to any other attractor. Heuristically, the
attractor for the system lies in a region of the space where the model is not defined, and is
prevented from moving toward the attractor by the projection facility. Such systems are
unlikely to converge.
5. Eliminating Forecast Errors
The idea that agents learn over time to eliminate systematic forecast errors lies at
the heart of the concept of rational expectations. A sensible question therefore is whether,
in the periodic learning equffibrium, systematic forecast errors exist which could be
eliminated. In fact such errors do exist, and they can be easily eliminated in a way that
makes thelearning equilibrium also a perfect foresight equilibrium.
To see this, consider the actual versus the perceived law ofmotion for prices in this
model:
Xfi~)
Actual: P =0 -1 P
H~1 ~(~) 4
Perceived: P4k’ = ~
The actual law ofmotion is derived from equations (1) and (2), while the perceived law of
motion is given by equation (3). When fi = 0, the actual law of motion equals the
perceived law ofmotion, and rational expectations equilibrium is attained.
Denote a strictly periodic learning equilibrium oforder k, attained at some time ~r,
145ee Marcet and Sargent (1989abc) and Grandmont and Laroque (1990b).
19by {fi}~ E {fi1, ~2’ 13k} where = fl~,fi1
= fi~1,and so on. The case of a
quasiperiodic learning equilibrium will be set aside for the moment. Then considering the
actual law of motion, the relationship between adjacent prices cannot be fixed in general,
since the ratio in the savings function cannot be constant. But the perceived law of
motion, representing a regression of prices in period t on those in period t—1, is specified
to find a fixed relationship between adjacent prices—a relationship of exactly the sort that
does not exist when the system converges to a cycle. Hence, forecast errors, calculated as
perceived P~1less actual P~1,do not tend to zero under this regression specification.
However, thefollowing lemma demonstrates that in a periodic equilibrium there is a
fixed relationship between certain prices, and hence also an alternative regression
specification, that can be exploited by the agents in this model in order to completely
eliminate all forecast errors and thus make the learning equilibrium into a rational
expectations equilibrium. In particular, along a periodic equilibriumof order k, there is a
fixedrelationship between prices ofperiod t and those ofperiod t—k.
LEMMA 3. Suppose {fi4}~ follows a periodic path denoted {~1~ ~ ~ where fi~ =
~k’~1
= fi~1,and so on. Then =




Since 134 = 13t+k’ itfi4) = i(~t+k)~ From equation (2), Ht+k = OkH4. Hence = o~Pi.I’5
15For the quasiperiodic case, the relationship between f3~ and ~+k is not exact. Then Ft.k is
only approximated by 0kp1, since P1 +k = OkP1Utfi1)/j(fl~ +k)] ~ 0kF1• Approximating the ratio of the
savings functions in this expression by 1+E implies that the periodic case occurs as e -4 0. As ~
deviates from zero, there is less and less sense in which there is a systematic relationship between the kth
prices that can be exploited by agents, and also less and less sense in which forecast errors are systematic.
20In other words, in the periodic learning equilibrium the agents are searching for a fixed
relationship between adjacent prices, when the actual fixed relationship is between the kth
prices. A regression specification that will detect this fixed relationship can be found as
follows. Let
=
where b4 is calculated at time t via
4—1 —1 4—1
b~ = [~~k] [~a~k”s]’
but represents the perceived gross inflation rate over the entire k periods that constitute
the cycle. Since agents only live for two periods, they care only about fi4, the perceived
gross inflation rate from period t to period t+1. This is related to the coefficient b4 by
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where
= ~_k-1~ ~_k] E (0,1).
21Equation (18) describes the dynamics of the system when agents form expectations by
regressing period t prices on period t—k prices.
LEMMA 4. Suppose {fi4}~0follows a periodic path denoted {fi1, ~ ••~~ where fi0
=
~k’ ~1
= fi~4~ and so on. Then the system described by (18) has a fixed point at b = 0~c.
PROOF. On the attractor, fl4—1
=
This result can be interpreted as follows. Agents regress prices from period t on
prices from period t—1 in order to try to learn to have perfect foresight. Provided 0 is
sufficiently small, the agents will succeed and the system will converge to the monetary
steady state. However, if the policy rule is for too rapid a rate of money growth, the
system under this learning rule will not converge to the monetary steady state and instead
may follow a periodic path after some time r. This is a periodic “learning equilibrium.”
In this case, the agents will observe systematic forecast errors and will want to eliminate
them by switching to a new forecast function. They can do this by switching, at some time
TI > r + k, to a regression ofperiod t prices on period t—k prices. Such a switch implies
the dynamic system described by equation (18). So long as agents use information from
period r to period r’, this system will immediately yield the fixed point b = 0h, and
agents will completely eliminate the forecast errors.
6. Discussion
Imposing rational expectations on economic models often implies multiple
equilibria, and which of these is the outcome under actual expectations is in doubt.
Authors have sometimes invoked the casual argument that agents will learn over time to
form rational expectations, and that the outcome ofthe learning process will be a rational
expectations equilibrium. Lucas (1987), for instance, has suggested that the outcome of a
22learning process in the overlapping generations model will be the monetary steady state,
and that learning lends plausibility to the study of rationalexpectations equilibria. Marcet
and Sargent (1989abc) have studied systems governed by least squares learning and
conclude that such systems, when they converge, converge to rational expectations
equilibria. Grandmont and Laroque (1990b) have suggested that systems with learning
may possess stationary equilibrium dynamics unrelated to stationary perfect foresight
dynamics. The results ofthis paper shed some light on these claims.
Specifically, a general equilibrium system with least squares learning can converge
to a periodic trajectory that does not exist under perfect foresight. Even in the
neighborhood of the monetary steady state, there can be no presumption that plausible
learning rules “select” the stationary equilibrium where money has value. Once the
bifurcation parameter is past the bifurcation point, there is no neighborhood that is
attracted to this steady state. Nor is it true that systems with least squares learners, when
they converge, necessarily converge to stationary rational expectations equilibria. Instead,
support is found for the idea that systems with learning can possess attractors independent
ofthosethat exist under perfect foresight.
A number of researchers have recently followed the lead of Azariadis (1981) and
others who have shown that widely used macroeconomic models, such as the overlapping
generations model analyzed here, can possess sunspot equilibria when frivolous variables
enter the forecast functions of agents. Woodford (1990) has shown that agents might
“learn to believe” in stationary sunspot equilibria. These models are sometimes advocated
as systems where macroeconomic complexity is explained. The same sort of claim can be
made for the model analyzed in this paper: for a certain values ofthe policy parameter, in
particular those that are “too high,” the dynamics of the model become complicated under
least squares learning. However, learning equilibria are based entirely on fundamentals and
do not require agents to “believe” in frivolous variables.
Although a standard version ofthe overlapping generations model is employed, the
23results of this paper are apparently unrelated to the existence of complicated perfect
foresight dynamics. The assumptions needed to admit a Hopf bifurcation near the
monetary steady state under least squares learning are such that the perfect foresight
cycles do not exist. In particular, a maintained assumption has been that first and second
period consumptionof agents are gross substitutes.
24Appendix 1
This appendix proves lemma 1.
LEMMA 1. (i) If lim4~fi4
= 0, ~ = lim4~,g4
= 1 — u2. (ii) Let , c’ be positive real
numbers, and let p be the bifurcation parameter, where p0 denotes the bifurcation point.
If, at some time r> 0, {fi4}’~ c (0—c,0+c), then {g4}~ c (~—E’,~+f’). Furthermore,
p — p0 I ‘0 ~0 ~‘0.
PROOF. This prooffollows the approach of Marcet and Sargent (1989b). Using equations
(1) and (2), repeated substitution shows that




4—1 1 2 —i
=[~ ~t+i 1(~:)J].
Part (i). Let iim4~ fl4
= 0. Choose some small positive real 5 exists such that
f (fi~)~ iimsup4~ 12 (1 + 5~
and
12
liminf — > (1—5).
i-~cs ~ ~2 -
Then S—~0 when fi~ —+ 0. Therefore,
252
or lim~~ g~ = ~ [tt+1]
lim~g4
= [i + 0_2 ++ ... + U~(4-~)] ~.
Since 0> 1,
lim g = i—U2. 4-wi
~9~o
Part (ii). Suppose that at some time r, the sequence is described by motion on
an invariant closed curve, induced by a Hopf bifurcation at p = p0. Denote the period k
cycle by B= {fi1, fi~}~ where = fit, fl1
= fi~1,and so on, in the periodic case, and
fi0 ~fl~fi1 ~fi~+1~ and so on, in the quasiperiodic case. The following fact about Hopf
bifurcations is employed: as i~ — i.’~ —. 0, the radius of the invariant closed curve
approaches zero (Ruelle, 1989). Therefore, at time r > 0, the sequence {~t}~r c
(O—f,O+), for some positive real E, and the points on the k—cycle can be made arbitrarily




mm flteB ~ (fi;~~)2
By the continuity of the savings function and choice of p, Fmjn can be made arbitrarily
close to 1. Therefore, using the argument in part(i),
i-r2






man fl1eB ~ (134)2
26so that
i-r2
liminf g < —~ i—U2 as f—+0.
F
mar
Hence, a positive real c’ can be chosen such that c (_g—~ ,~+c’), and —+ 0
implies ~‘ —+ 0. ~
Appendix 2
The HopfBifurcation Theorem is applied in thetext.
THEOREM. (HopfBifurcation). Let a U’, s ~ 6, one parameter family of mappings be
given by F: I x U ~_. fl~2 where U is an open subset of ~2, p0 E I, and I is an open
subset of IL Let ~*(p) U be a fixed point of Fa t which the eigenvalues of DF are
the complex conjugates p(p0), ~(p0). Let F be C2 in p. Assume
(i) I~(~0)I = 1
(ii)
Let (r,a) represent the radius and angle of a polar coordinate, where a = a(p0) indicates
a function of p0. Assume
(iii) a(p0) # 2ir/q, q = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Let vi., i = 1,2,3,4 represent constants. Then there exists a ~ change of coordinates h
such that hFh~ has the polar coordinates form
hFh~(r,a) = [r(i +w 1(p — p0) + w2r2), a + w3 + w4r2] + higher order terms.
If w2 < 0 (w2 > 0) there exists a right (left) neighborhood of p0 in which there is an
invariant attracting (repelling) closed curve for F in V.
Statements of the theorem can be found in Grandmont (1988), Guckenheimer and
Holmes (1983), or Ruelle (1989).
27Appendix 3
The Center Manifold Theorem is applied in thetext.
THEOREM. (Center manifold). Consider the nonlinear map C: U -4 IRm, where U is a
subset of IRtm. Denote the fixed point by ~ such that G(7*) = #1* Assume the map is
twice continuously differentiable. Then a neighborhood V of ~ exists such that there is a
local center manifold Wc in V with first order continuous derivatives. The manifold is
locally attracting, in thatfor ‘y, G”(’y~(n indicating the nth iterate1~ C) in V V n, the
distance between G~(7)and Wc tends to zero as n~a,.
For detailed discussions see Grandmont (1988), boss (1979), Guckenheimer and Holmes
(1983), or Carr (1981).
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